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The sad fact is that honest lawyers sometimes have crooked clients. In a
notorious 1980 case of client fraud, a pair of businessmen used the services of
an unsuspecting law firm to close hundreds of millions of dollars worth of
crooked loans for their computer leasing company. The businessmen- created
forged leases to inflate the value of their company's contracts, which they used
as collateral for the loans. In the evenings, the pair would turn the lights off in
their office. Goodman would crouch beneath a glass table shining a flashlight
upward so that Weissman could trace signatures from genuine leases onto the
forgeries. New loans serviced previous loans in a decade-long pyramid scheme.
After nearly ten years, Goodman and Weissman's accountant stumbled across
their frauds. He wrote a detailed warning to the swindlers' law firm, which the
accountant's lawyer tried to hand-deliver to Joseph Hutner, the law firm's lead
partner.
But Hutner didn't want to see it. In fact, he wanted the accountant to take the
letter back. Above all, Hutner seemed to want to preserve his own oblivion. As
the accountant's lawyer later recounted, "I had visions of him clamping his
hands over his ears and running out of the office."'
Well, wouldn't you? Hutner had been used. He had mouths to feed in his
firm, and the computer crooks represented more than half the firm's annual
billings. His flight reaction probably came straight from the gut. It may also
have been the result of a calculation, however. Legal ethics rules forbid lawyers
from knowingly participating in fraud, and Hutner may have reasoned that if he
didn't know about any fraud, his firm wouldn't have to part ways with its
bread-and-butter client. At the very least, maintaining deniability might buy
some time to figure out the next move.
The fact is that ignorance can be vital. A white-collar defense attorney offers
the following recollection:
I can remember years ago when I represented a fellow in a massive case of
political corruption. I was very young, and I asked him, "Would you please
* Frederick J. Haas Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University Law Center. This
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tell me everything that happened." And he said, "What, are you out of your
mind?" 2
The man had a point. Because lawyers are forbidden from lying or knowingly
putting on perjured testimony, knowing too much can tie a lawyer's hands. The
lawyer is foreclosed from using the strongest arguments on the client's behalf
because, unfortunately, the strongest arguments are false.
Lawyers often complain that it's hard to get clients to tell them the unvar-
nished truth. But it can be an equal challenge to avoid facts that the lawyer
really doesn't want to know. Criminal defense lawyers rarely ask their clients,
"Did you do it?" Instead, they ask the client what evidence he thinks the police
or prosecution have against him-whom he spoke with, who the witnesses are,
what documents or physical evidence he knows about. If the client seems too
eager to spill his guts, the lawyer will quickly cut him off, admonishing him that
time is short and that it will be best if the client answers only the questions his
lawyer asks him. These questions will be posed carefully and framed narrowly.
"Don't ask, don't tell" is the strategy, and the preservation of deniability is its
goal.3
Lawyers may be exceptional in the self-conscious casuistry they bring to their
quest for deniability, but they are in no way exceptional in the quest itself. The
very word "deniability," which originated after the Bay of Pigs debacle, gained
currency in the Watergate era to describe something that Richard Nixon's
subordinates wanted to preserve for him at all costs. The Iran-Contra principals
turned out to be veritable Balanchines when it came to choreographing Ronald
Reagan's deniability. They knew very well that deniability is a politician's best
friend.
Business managers also understand the value of deniability. Analyzing the
authority system in large American corporations, sociologist Robert Jackall
writes that "pushing down details relieves superiors of the burden of too much
knowledge, particularly guilty knowledge.", 4 In the familiar corporate adage,
bad news doesn't flow upstream.
A superior will say to a subordinate ... : "Give me your best thinking on the
problem..." When the subordinate makes his report, he is often told: "I think
you can do better than that," until the subordinate has worked out all the
details of the boss's predetermined solution, without the boss being specifi-
cally aware of "all the eggs that have to be broken."
5
2. KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK 104-05
(1985).
3. See Lincoln Caplan, Don'tAsk, Don't Tell, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 1, 1994, at 22.




Deniability refers to one's capacity to deny guilty knowledge truthfully.
Clearly, deniability is a state of affairs desirable almost beyond price, and not
only for lawyers, politicians, and executives. Deniability is the key to succeed-
ing at the world's work, which is often dirty, while keeping a clean con-
science-or at least a serviceable facsimile of a clean conscience. Perhaps the
truth will set us free, but sometimes ignorance of the truth will leave us freer still.
Virtually all of us prefer not to know things, if knowing them will require us
to take unwelcome action. Why does our conscience work that way? The
reason, I suspect, is that the quest for deniability seems not as bad as dishonesty.
A dishonest person simply learns the truth and then lies about it. Evading truth
is an expedient for avoiding lies. It's a stratagem for tarnished angels like you
and me, not for unrepentant scoundrels. It's the homage that vice pays to virtue.
And yet avoiding lies can't be as simple as shutting one's eyes. Hungry lions
don't go away when the ostrich in the legend sticks her head in the sand-that is
one reason we know that it's only a legend. Guilty knowledge is a hungry lion,
and it can't be ignored out of existence. Or can it? This is the question I propose
to investigate. Soon it will lead us into complications, but for the moment we
can pose the question itself in three simple words: Does deniability work?
I. WILLFUL IGNORANCE IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
Let's start by asking what light the law sheds on our question. To lawyers in
the common law tradition, deniability brings to mind a familiar criminal law
doctrine called willful ignorance-or, as it is sometimes called, "willful blind-
ness" or "conscious avoidance.", 6 In essence, the doctrine states that willful
ignorance is equivalent to knowledge. Self-generated deniability doesn't work:
you can be convicted of knowingly committing a crime even if you don't
commit it knowingly-provided that you contrived your own ignorance.
The doctrine seems intuitively just. But why? It is Biblical wisdom that we
forgive those who know not what they do. Culpability presupposes a guilty
mind. But ignorance is nothing more than an empty mind, and for that reason
there is a profound puzzle in explaining exactly why ignorance, willed or not,
should support criminal convictions. The Orwellian-sounding identity
IGNORANCE = KNOWLEDGE is, to put it mildly, an equation crying out for a
theory. Criminal lawyers take two approaches to this problem, neither of which
satisfies me.
A. THE NEGLIGENCE APPROACH
The first approach is to argue that even if the wrongdoer didn't know, he
should have known. But the phrase "should have known" triggers a familiar
line of legal reasoning. "Should have known" implies a legal duty to know, and
failure to know amounts to negligence.
6. One writer identifies fourteen different terms for the concept in the criminal law. See Robin
Charlow, Wilful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1351, 1352 n. 1 (1992).
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In other words, "he should have known, but he didn't" means in the common
law that he was negligent. This familiar point of doctrine leads to two problems.
The first is explaining why we have a duty to know. The law is generally
reluctant to impose affirmative duties on people, unless they occupy posts of
special responsibility. And a duty to know is especially dubious. It can't really
be that we have a duty to inform ourselves about everything that might affect
our obligations-that duty would know no outer bound, and fulfilling it would
take up all of our time for the rest of our lives. It also raises moral problems of
its own. Is it a duty not to mind our own business? A duty to meddle? A duty to
pry? A duty to snoop? A duty to mistrust and double-check every suspicious fact
someone else tells us? Common sense tells us that we have no such duty. But
then where's the negligence?
The second problem is that even if we agree that willful ignorance is a kind
of negligence, doing something negligently is less culpable than doing it
knowingly. The usual hierarchy of blame in the criminal law moves in ordered
steps. The Model Penal Code, for example, distinguishes four levels of culpabil-
ity. The worst is acting willfully or purposely by making the misdeed our
conscious object.7 Next is acting knowingly by acting in full awareness of our
misdeed, although not necessarily with the misdeed as our object.8 Next comes
acting recklessly by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that we are doing wrong.9 Last comes acting negligently by acting when we
should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of misdeed, even if we
are not actually aware. °
In other words, negligence isn't as bad as knowledge; in the Model Penal
Code scheme, it is two levels removed from knowledge. Suppose that a statute
forbids knowingly transporting a controlled substance across state lines. If I
transport a controlled substance negligently-merely negligently, as my lawyer
will insist-I cannot be convicted under this statute. The prosecutor must prove
that I did it knowingly. Under the negligence analysis of willful ignorance,
willful ignorance cannot be equivalent to knowledge, and the common law
equation collapses.
Nor is this a purely theoretical problem. Every good criminal lawyer under-
stands how it might play out in practice. The most frequent complaint about
willful blindness instructions to a jury is that such instructions illicitly convert
crimes requiring knowledge to crimes of mere negligence. As the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals admonished while reversing a willful blindness convic-
tion, ostriches "are not merely careless birds.""
7. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
8. See id. § 2.02(2)(b).
9. See id. § 2.02(2)(c).
10. See id. § 2.02(2)(d).
11. United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1228 (7th Cir. 1990) (reversing a conviction
following a willful blindness jury instruction on the grounds that aider and abettor liability is triggered
by actual knowledge of the illegal acts, not mere negligence).
960 [Vol. 87:957
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B. THE MODEL PENAL CODE APPROACH
The alternative to treating willful blindness as negligence is to find an actual,
occurrent mental state to which willful blindness corresponds. The drafters of
the Model Penal Code simply abandoned the doctrine that willful blindness can
substitute for knowledge. In its place, they proposed that awareness of the high
probability of a fact is tantamount to knowledge of that fact. 12 In this way, they
preserved the root intuition that criminal guilt requires some guilty mental
state. Here, the guilty mental state is awareness of the high probability of a
fact, presumably whatever fact the willfully blind person is arranging not to
know.
Unfortunately, this proposal raises more problems than it solves. First of all,
being aware that something is highly probable simply isn't the same as actually
knowing it. I don't mean that knowledge implies certainty rather than probabil-
ity; knowledge-claims need not be infallible. But knowledge does require
belief-I can hardly be said to know something if I don't even believe it-
whereas awareness that something is highly probable may stop short of the
inferential leap into belief. One way to see this is by comparing the two
statements "I know X but I don't believe X" and "I'm aware that X is highly
probable, but I don't believe X." The first of these verges on performative
self-contradiction-an observation that philosophers call Moore's Paradox-
while the second does not.
This difference between awareness of high probability and knowledge has not
passed unnoticed by commentators, who draw various conclusions from it. One
recommends cutting the Gordian knot by defining knowledge of a fact as
awareness that it is highly probable.' 3 That solves the problem, but only by
converting the word "knowledge" into a legal term of art. Departing from the
everyday meaning of words is seldom a good idea in law, and never more so
than in criminal law, in which substituting eccentric meanings for words risks
punishing us without fair notice. Other commentators go in the opposite direc-
tion, and conclude that the Model Penal Code awareness-of-high-probability
formula can really support convictions only for crimes requiring some mental
state less than knowledge.1
4
12. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("When knowledge of the
existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is
aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist.").
13. See Jonathan L. Marcus, Note, Model Penal Code Section 2.02(7) and Willful Blindness, 102
YALE L.J. 2231, 2233, 2253 (1993) (arguing that the use of a "broad definition of knowledge" rather
than "carving out a willful blindness alternative to a strict knowledge requirement" would better serve
the ends of the criminal law).
14. One, for example, argues that the Model Penal Code standard defines not knowledge but
recklessness, which (you will recall) means consciously disregarding a substantial risk of wrongdoing.
See Ira. P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate Ignorance as a Criminal Mens Rea, 81 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 191, 223-27 (1990) (noting that "the high probability language of the Code
indicates recklessness" rather than indicating strict knowledge which requires certainty). Another thinks
that the Code standard, which requires awareness of high risk rather than mere substantial risk, has
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The trouble with all these proposals is that they are not really about will-
ful ignorance at all. Instead, they change the subject. The focus in a will-
ful ignorance case is on whether the actor deliberately avoided guilty
knowledge. The inquiry is about whatever steps the actor took to ward
off knowledge prior to the misdeed. The focus in the Model Penal Code,
by contrast, is on how certain the actor is about a fact. The inquiry is about
the actor's subjective state at the moment of the misdeed. These are com-
pletely different issues. An actor can be aware of the high probability of a fact
whether or not she took steps to avoid knowing it, and an actor can screen herself
from knowledge of facts regardless of whether their probability is high or low.'
5
In practice, to be sure, the Model Penal Code standard provides a serviceable
substitute for willful ignorance. That is because in most cases of willful
ignorance the defendant will be Aware of the high probability of the fact that he
has hidden from himself, so that the Model Penal Code doctrine succeeds in
convicting most of the miscreants who deserve it. It convicts the drug mule who
deliberately refrains from looking in the satchel he's delivering. It convicts the
corporate manager who doesn't ask why his overseas salesman needs a million
in cash for "commissions." And it just may convict the lawyer who clamps his
hands over his ears and runs out of the office because he doesn't want to stop
closing loans for crooked clients.'
6
Unfortunately, it does not convict the high ranking executive who deliber-
ately, skillfully, and self-consciously fashions an entire structure of deniability, a
reporting system in which for years at a time guilty knowledge never flows
upstream. Once the system is in place, business goes on as usual-most of it
proper, but some of it perhaps improper. But the executive has no awareness of
the probability of the improper stuff, maybe not even awareness of its possibil-
ity, because when he contrived the reporting system, he had no specific crimes
in mind.
thereby defined something between recklessness and knowledge. See Charlow, supra note 6, at
1394-97. Both conclude that Code-based willful ignorance should support convictions only for crimes
requiring mental states less culpable than knowledge.
15. Douglas Husak and Craig Callender illustrate the latter with a nice pair of examples. Suppose
that a dope distributor tells each of his three couriers never to look in the suitcase he gives to each one,
adding that it isn't necessary for them to know what the suitcases contain. If the suitcases contain dope,
the case is plainly one of willful ignorance. But now suppose that the distributor adds that two of the
three suitcases contain nothing but clothing, that he is truthful, and that the distributors know he is
truthful. If the couriers deliver the suitcases without looking inside and without asking any questions,
the case seems indistinguishable from the first case. It is still willful ignorance. But in the second case,
the courier with dope in his suitcase lacks awareness of the high probability that it contains dope.
Indeed, he knows that the probability is only one-third. He may even believe that his suitcase contains
nothing but clothes. Thus, in the language of the Model Penal Code § 2.02(7), he not only lacks
awareness of a high probability of the fact's existence, "he actually believes that it does not exist." See
Douglas N. Husak & Craig A. Callender, Willful Ignorance, Knowledge, and the "Equal Culpability"
Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of the Principle of Legality, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 29, 37-38.
16. In fact, Hutner was never indicted for aiding and abetting the computer crooks. But, for a case in
which a lawyer went to jail for writing his client's lies into an opinion letter without investigating them,
see United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863-64 (2d Cir. 1964).
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How does a structure of deniability work? It goes like this. The CEO lets
everyone know that he hates to micromanage. He is interested only in the big
picture of whether goals are met, not in details about how they are met. It goes
without saying (and I do mean without saying!) that the CEO is to be sheltered
from bad news, especially knowledge that anyone in the organization has cut
legal comers. Like ambitious subordinates everywhere, his management team
tries to anticipate his wishes and, in the familiar corporate adage, "follow them
in advance" so they won't actually have to be spoken aloud. Managers too
obtuse to understand this are said to lack initiative, and their careers are short.
Prominent among the unspoken directives is the first commandment: Thou shalt
maintain thy boss's deniability. 17
For public consumption, the organization sets up an elaborate accountability
mechanism, requiring employees to report in writing anything they observe that
is illegal, unethical, or unsafe. In practice, however, employees who follow
these instructions find themselves reassigned to the company's North Dakota
Wind Chill Test Facility. Old timers explain to newcomers that the purpose of
the reporting mechanism is not to be utilized, thereby ensuring that only the
lowest-level employees-those who fail to file their written reports-will bear
the blame if anything goes wrong. In fact, management sees little advantage in
an accurate system for tracking responsibility within the corporation. Too many
managers advance by getting promoted to new divisions before the chickens
come home to roost at the old divisions. This is called "outrunning your
mistakes." 18 The last thing they want is a paper trail.
I should put my cards on the table. My abiding interest over the past few
years has been the many and subtle ways in which organizations screen
individuals within them from liability and dissolve employees' sense of per-
sonal accountability. In my view, concepts of collective or corporate responsibil-
ity are poor substitutes for individual responsibility. For one thing, blaming the
collective may let individuals off the hook too easily. It's not for nothing that the
Nuremberg Charter made individual criminal liability the linchpin of its ap-
proach to state-sponsored crime.1 9 At the same time, collectivizing guilt may
blame innocent employees. Last but not least, collective responsibility concepts
teeter on the brink of quack metaphysics or mystical science fiction, treating
groups of people as single minds. No better illustration of this can be found than
the collective knowledge doctrine in federal criminal law. 20 According to this
17. See John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing, in CODES OF
CONDucr: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH IN BusINEss ETHics 13, 24-25 (David M. Messick & Ann E.
Tenbrunsel eds., 1996). See also JACKALL, supra note 4, at 18-19.
18. See JACKALL supra note 4, at 90-95 (detailing ways in which managers exploit the absence of
responsibility tracking mechanisms to "milk" their businesses, get promoted up the corporate ladder as
a reward for cost-cutting, and stick their successors with the aftermath).
19. See DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 338-39, 350-52, 365-72 (1994) (discussing aspects and
implications of individual criminal liability in Nuremberg trials).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that
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doctrine, a corporation "knows" the sum of what all of its employees know,
whether they communicate with each other or not. 2' The doctrine treats employ-
ees as synapses in the nonexistent brain of a legal fiction.
How, then, can the law apportion individual responsibility within the organiza-
tional context, where too many involved individuals act at a distance and each
knows too little? In my view, the most promising approach is through the
concept of complicity-aiding and abetting- and the concept of willful igno-
rance. Supervisors implicitly or explicitly encourage their subordinates to meet
their targets by any means necessary. That's abetting. Supervisors provide
assistance and resources. That's aiding. And supervisors structure the organiza-
tion to preserve their own deniability. That's willful ignorance. Willful igno-
rance is a concept that applies almost uniquely to crimes committed by group
enterprises. Of course, a good whodunit author can devise clever scenarios in
which a lone gunman contrives his own ignorance at the moment he pulls the
trigger. But, in real life, I can contrive ignorance only when I work with others
who know the facts that I don't.
Together, the concepts of aiding, abetting, and willful ignorance enable us to
understand the dimensions of supervisory wrongdoing-the wrongdoing C. S.
Lewis had in mind when he wrote about evils committed by "quiet men with
white collars and cut fingernails and smooth-shaven cheeks who do not need to
raise their voice., 22 In that case, however, the Model Penal Code substitute for
the willful ignorance doctrine should be rejected because it's simply too narrow
for the task at hand.
In sum, the common law's equation of willful ignorance with knowledge
leaves us in a dilemma: is willful ignorance a guilty mental state, or the
violation of a duty to know? The Model Penal Code employs a knowledge
concept (awareness of a high probability) rather than mere negligence. But not
only is the Model Penal Code standard quite distinct from willful ignorance, it
is also too weak for organizational settings. The negligence theory succeeds in
the collective knowledge instruction was appropriate in the context of corporate criminal liability and
necessary in light of the Bank's compartmentalized structure).
21. See id. (noting that a corporation "cannot plead innocence by asserting that the information
obtained by several employees was not acquired by any one individual who then would have
comprehended its full import" (quoting United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 738
(W.D. W. Va. 1974))).
Even more problematic than corporate responsibility is the notion of collective responsibility, that is,
holding individuals responsible for actions performed by other individuals in the same group. Some
communitarian theorists defend collective responsibility by arguing that individual identity is consti-
tuted by relationships with groups to which one belongs. But I disagree. I have criticized the
communitarian idea that selves are "constituted" by social relationships. See David Luban, The Self:
Metaphysical Not Political, I LEGAL THEORY 401 (1995). I reject not only anti-individualist concep-
tions of the self, but also Meir Dan-Cohen's argument that the self's boundaries are a function of
responsibility-ascriptions. See id. at 412-17 (criticizing Dan-Cohen's argument); see also Meir Dan-
Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HAIRv. L. REv. 959 (1992). In my view,
metaphysical individualism is a more plausible theory than its more collectivist alternatives, which
underlie collective guilt.
22. C. S. LEWIS, THE SCREWTAPE LErrERs AND SCREWTrPE PROPOSES A TOAST, at x (1962).
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explaining how mere ignorance can be culpable, as the Model Penal Code does
not. But the negligence theory employs a duty-to-know concept less stringent
than knowledge, and too demanding for real life.
II. A NASTY EXAMPLE
Let me propose a diagnosis. The two theories fail because willful ignorance is
neither knowledge nor negligence. Consider an example-a sinister example,
but one that I find particularly thought-provoking.
In the early days of the Third Reich, Albert Speer was Hitler's official
architect. Later, he moved into more essential posts, and eventually he became
the minister of armaments during the war, responsible for, among other things,
producing war material through slave labor in concentration camps. Unsurpris-
ingly, Speer was tried in the first tier of Nuremberg defendants, as a member of
the leadership of the Third Reich.
Speer was the only one of the defendants who insisted on taking full
responsibility for the crimes of the Reich. He did it, he explained, in order to
ensure that the German people would not suffer any more than they already had
for the sins of their leaders. Probably because of his confession, Speer received
a twenty-year sentence, whereas others no guiltier were hanged. After his
release from Spandau Prison, Speer published a best-selling memoir, Inside the
Third Reich, and followed it up with two more volumes of recollections. In the
books, he once again took full responsibility, and cemented his reputation as, in
the sarcastic title of a recent biography, "the good Nazi."-
23
Let me be a bit more specific about what Speer did and did not confess to.
Four points stand out:
(1) He accepted full responsibility for the crimes of the Reich.
(2) He denied, however, that he actually knew anything about the Final
Solution.
(3) He also acknowledged that he could have known, but chose not to know
in order to keep his conscience clear.
(4) He insisted that his willful ignorance was just as bad as knowledge, and
thus he refused to let himself off the hook.
For example, Speer recalls that in 1944 a friend of his warned him "never to
accept an invitation to inspect a concentration camp in Upper Silesia. Never
under any circumstances.", 24 Speer described his thought processes as follows:
I did not query him, I did not query Himmler, I did not query Hitler, I did not
speak with personal friends. I did not investigate-for I did not want to know
23. DAN VAN DER VAT, THE GOOD NAZI: THE LIFE AND LIES OF ALBERT SPEER (1997).
24. ALBERT SPEER, INSIDE THE THIRD REICH: MEMOIRS 375-76 (Richard & Clara Winston trans.,
1970).
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what was happening there.... From that moment on, I was inescapably
contaminated morally; from fear of discovering something which might have
made me turn from my course, I had closed my eyes.... Because I failed at
that time, I still feel, to this day, responsibility for Auschwitz in a wholly
personal sense.25
For Auschwitz was the very camp Speer's friend was warning him to avoid.
The interesting thing about Speer is that he was almost certainly lying about
how little he knew. Indeed, journalists and historians have made a minor cottage
industry of smoking out Albert Speer's lies.26 Speer's response, to the end of his
life, was to insist that he really didn't know.
What makes this interesting, of course, is that Speer also insisted that whether
he knew or not is irrelevant, because he is equally guilty in either case. Then
why insist on ignorance? The legal theorist Leo Katz suggests that Speer "was
being coy, was playing Marc Anthony by saying he was not seeking to excuse
himself while going to such extraordinary pains to establish his willful igno-
rance. He really did think it mitigated his guilt." 27
I am sure that Katz is right about Speer being coy. I'm less certain that Speer
really thought willful ignorance mitigated his guilt. Albert Speer was a master
of public relations. From Nuremberg on, he instinctively understood that the
best way to dodge responsibility is to assume it-but not to assume responsibil-
ity for any particular heinous deeds. Whether or not he himself believed that
willful ignorance mitigated his guilt, I am sure Speer understood that the world
at large believes it.
Or rather, he understood that the world at large can't make up its mind. The
paradox is that we seem to accept his subtext, "I'm not as guilty as if I really
knew!" but only because his text insists that he is as guilty as if he really knew.
We nod yes when Albert Speer writes, "I was inescapably contaminated
morally," 28 and then we forgive him, at least in part.
I think that Leo Katz draws the wrong conclusion from this example. He
argues that the forgiveness, the subtext, reflects our deepest moral understand-
ing, and thus he concludes that willful ignorance is a proper moral excuse. But
why assume that we really believe the subtext, when we nod yes to the text?
Perhaps we do absolve Albert Speer, at least in part. But we also convict
criminals on willful blindness instructions. Curiously, Katz overlooks this fact.
He writes that willful ignorance excuses "often work at a legal level.... The
25. Id. at 376.
26. See, e.g., HENRY T. KING, JR., WITH BETTINA ELLES, THE TWO WORLDS OF ALBERT SPEER:
REFLECTIONS OF A NUREMBERG PROSECUTOR 97-106 (1997); MATrHIAS SCHMIDT, ALBERT SPEER: THE
END OF A MYTH passim (Joachim Neugroschel trans., 1982); ALBERT SPEER: KONTROVERSEN UM EIN
DEUTSCHES PHANOMEN passim (Adelbert Reif ed., 1978); VAN DER VAT, supra note 23. It should be
added that the evidence of the extent of Speer's knowledge is circumstantial.
27. LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW
41(1996).
28. SPEER, supra note 24, at 376.
[Vol. 87:957
CONTRIVED IGNORANCE
law here as so often is a good gauge of our moral intuitions. So I rather think
the ruses work at a moral level as well."' 29 Katz relies on an example to
demonstrate that willful ignorance excuses work at a legal level-the criminal
defense lawyer who uses a "don't ask, don't tell" strategy for circumventing the
rule against knowingly helping a client commit perjury. This is an example we
have seen before. It's an apt example, for this is one place in the law where the
"ostrich excuse" does work. The bar's legal ethics rules don't require a lawyer
to investigate the client's story, nor do they incorporate the doctrine that willful
ignorance equals knowledge. But of course the criminal law does incorporate
that doctrine. For some reason, Katz overlooks the fact that in the criminal law,
willful ignorance is ground for conviction, rather than acquittal.
The proper conclusion is that the law speaks with a divided voice about
willful ignorance excuses. If Katz is correct that the law is a good gauge of our
moral intuitions, it would follow that morality speaks with a divided voice as
well. The question is why.
30
III. THE OSTRICH AND THE Fox
Let's go back to something Albert Speer said in his mea culpa about his
responsibility for Auschwitz. "[F]rom fear of discovering something which
might have made me turn from my course, I had closed my eyes.",3' Speer's
formulation gets close to the heart of our problem. Suppose for the sake of
29. KATz, supra note 27, at 44.
30. This puzzle exists in theological discussions as well. Christian moralists developed an elaborate
theory about when ignorance excuses wrongdoing and when it does not. The key variables in the theory
concern how cognizant of his own ignorance the wrongdoer is, whether he lies under a duty to dispel it,
and whether he did anything, either by omission or commission, to foster his ignorance. The moralists
distinguished ignorance arising from mere neglect to inform oneself-so-called "crass" or "supine"
ignorance-from ignorance deliberately cultivated-" affected ignorance" (ignorantia affectata). Af-
fected ignorance corresponds closely with the common law's willful blindness. According to one writer,
"[An act done through ignorance, even if that ignorance be crass or supine, is less culpable than an act
done with clear knowledge; for it is less fully voluntary, and, therefore, less imputable. As regards the
ignorance which is deliberately fostered, there is a divergence of opinion among moralists." G.H.
Joyce, Invincible Ignorance, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION & ETHIcs 404 (James Hastings ed., 1915).
This "divergence of opinion among moralists" seems appropriate, given the divided voice in the law
and in our moral intuitions.
Judaism places less emphasis than Christianity does on interior states of soul and more on external
behavior. As befits a faith based on thousands of years of fidelity to a divinely-authored text, Judaism
also emphasizes the letter of the law over the spirit. Some of the most ingenious reasoning in Jewish
law has been loophole lawyering designed to mitigate the rigors of the commandments in the face of
life on the edge of constant menace, and a rigid textualism sometimes turns out to be the compassionate
rabbi's best tool for blunting the law's harsh edges. As one contemporary rabbi explains, "God made no
mistakes.... If he left a loophole, he put it there to be used." Clyde Haberman, Alon Shevut Journal:
Thank the Lord for Loopholes: Sabbath Is Safe, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 19, 1994, at A4. Unsurprisingly, then,
Jewish ethics do not condemn willful blindness. In fact, in some cases Jewish ethics encourage it. The
law treats bastard children harshly, and so a good Jew should remain willfully blind to the circum-
stances of birth of a suspected bastard. Likewise, compassion suggests willfully blinding ourselves to
circumstances that would void a contract on which an innocent person relies. (I owe these examples to
my colleague, Professor Sherman Cohn.)
31. SPEER, supra note 24, at 375-76.
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argument that Speer was not lying. Let us say that he really didn't know about
Auschwitz, because he had closed his eyes. In that case, the question we
confront is what he would have done had he not closed his eyes. He might have
turned from his course, he tells us, but would he have? If the answer is yes, then
we mitigate our judgment of him, at least a little bit.32 If the answer is no, then
we blame him more. Not only did he knowingly participate in genocide, but he
prepared a cover-up, a clever willful ignorance defense, as well.
That's one reason why we can't make up our minds about willful ignorance
excuses. They amount to counterfactual assertions that if the person had known,
he would have changed his course. To which the response must be: Maybe so,
maybe not. Maybe the person offering the excuse really is an ostrich, a moral
weakling in self-inflicted denial that he confronts a moral choice. In that case,
willful ignorance seems not as bad as actual knowledge. But maybe the
would-be ostrich is actually a fox-a grand schemer who fully intends to follow
the path of wrongdoing, and who contrived his ignorance only as a liability-
screening precaution, like a good getaway car. In that case, willful ignorance
seems more culpable than knowledge, because it adds to knowledge an element
of unrepentant calculation.
Ostrich or Fox? We'll never know. Nor will we ever be sure whether the
Ostrich would have turned from wrongdoing if she had only taken her head out
of the sand to learn that it was wrongdoing. Would she or wouldn't she? The
excuse of willful ignorance functions precisely to make that question unanswer-
able.
The question may be unanswerable even by the Ostrich herself. Speer says
only that knowledge might have made him turn from his course, and in this
observation he is keenly perceptive. Many of us who close our eyes actually
have no idea what we would do if we had elected to leave them open. We like to
think that we would turn from our wrongful course, but perhaps we lack the
intestinal fortitude. Willful ignorance is a moral strategy for postponing the
moment of truth, for sparing ourselves the test of our resolve. St. Augustine
famously prayed to God to give him the strength to resist temptation, only not
yet.33 The Ostrich hopes to God that she has the strength to resist temptation-
only she doesn't want to find out yet. It's Augustine Lite, Augustine in a slightly
more infantile form.
The Fox, on the other hand, is a premeditating crook, a grand schemer whose
only reason for guarding himself from knowledge is to prepare a defense of
ignorance.34 Our ambivalence about the willful ignorance excuse reflects, at
32. We no longer hold him fully accountable for knowingly participating in genocide-just for
knowingly participating in the murder of Hitler's opponents, the planning of World War II, and twelve
years of violent racism! If you're Albert Speer, you take your mitigation where you can find it.
33. "I had prayed to you for chastity and said 'Give me chastity and continence, but not yet.' For I
was afraid that you would answer my prayer at once and cure me too soon of the disease of lust, which I
wanted satisfied, not quelled." ST. AUGUSTINE, Book VIII, in CONFESSIONS 169 (R. S. Pine-Coffin trans., 1961).
34. In conversation, David Wasserman has pointed out another possible motivation for the Fox to
[Vol. 87:957
CONTRIVED IGNORANCE
least in part, our inability to resolve a fuzzy stereoscopic image, the portrait of
an Ostrich superimposed on the portrait of a Fox. Our intuitions run very
differently depending on which image we have in mind, and, without thinking
about matters carefully, we probably have both images in mind.
In fact, we have three images superimposed on each other, not just two.
Alongside the Fox, we have the weak-willed, unrighteous Ostrich who would
have continued to do wrong even if she knew that was what she was doing, and
we have the stronger-willed, half-righteous Ostrich who shields herself from
guilty knowledge, but would actually do the right thing if the shield were to fail.
At this point, let me venture a diagnosis of why we have so much difficulty
deciding how blameworthy willful ignorance really is. The grand-scheming
Fox, who aims to do wrong and structures his own ignorance merely to prepare
a defense, has the same level of culpability as any other willful wrongdoer-the
highest level, in the Model Penal Code schema. The Unrighteous Ostrich, who
doesn't want to know she is doing wrong, but would do it even if she knew,
seems precisely fitted for the common-law equation of willful ignorance with
knowledge. By definition, her guilt is unchanged whether she knows or not,
because her behavior would be unchanged. And the Half-Righteous Ostrich,
who won't do wrong if she knows, but would prefer not to know, is in a state of
conscious avoidance of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of wrongdoing-
precisely the Model Penal Code's definition of recklessness.
In short, motivation makes a difference. Three different motivations corre-
spond with three levels of blame. One is less blameworthy than knowledge, one
is precisely as blameworthy as knowledge, and one is more blameworthy. Our
moral intuitions aren't contradictory after all. Instead, the best diagnosis is that
when we evaluate willful ignorance we have three distinct moral intuitions,
depending on which inhabitant of the bestiary we call to mind.
IV. THE STRUCTURE OF CONTRIVED IGNORANCE
At this point, I want to look more carefully at the structure of contrived
ignorance. The crucial point is that it involves not one set of actions, but two.
The first consists of the actions or omissions by which an actor shields herself
from unwanted knowledge. For convenience, let me call them the screening
actions. When the lawyer interviewing her client breaks off a dangerous line of
questioning, when the drug courier refrains from .looking in the suitcase, when
the executive rewards subordinates who maintain his deniability, they have
performed screening actions. The second set of actions consists of whatever
misdeeds the actor subsequently commits that would be innocent if, but only if,
choose willful ignorance. The Fox may fear that he is too squeamish to carry out his misdeed if he
knows at the time what he is doing-but he nevertheless wants to carry it out, and therefore contrives to
be ignorant. This alternative motivation still makes the actor a Fox, not an Ostrich, because the
ignorance is willed only as a stratagem to facilitate the misdeed.
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she was legitimately ignorant. Call these the unwitting misdeeds.35
Once we draw this distinction, several interesting points emerge. The first is
that screening actions, like unwitting misdeeds, can be performed with various
degrees of mens rea. If we use words carefully, the word "willful" modifying
"ignorance" should describe the mens rea with which an actor contrives her
own ignorance. This leaves open the possibility that ignorance can be contrived
at other levels of culpability. A political leader or corporate executive who
intentionally sets up an organizational structure designed to maintain his deniabil-
ity is willfully ignorant. His partner, who didn't set up the structure but is
perfectly happy to benefit from it, may not be willfully ignorant, but is nonethe-
less knowingly ignorant. Their successor, who decides to run the risk of keeping
the structure in place, may well be recklessly ignorant. And Reckless's dimwit-
ted partner Feckless, who never even wonders why their predecessors are taking
unpaid leave at Club Fed, is negligently ignorant. None of these levels of
culpability, except willful ignorance, is a category recognized by the law, even
though the hierarchy of mental states (willful, knowing, reckless, negligent) is
entirely familiar. Contrived ignorance turns out to be a genus, and each of these
mental states to be a distinct species.
Ignoring the distinction between screening actions and unwitting misdeeds
can lead to an overly simple theory of willful ignorance. The Model Penal Code
approach, which we examined earlier, is a perfect example. It focuses entirely
on the mens rea accompanying the unwitting misdeed, and completely ignores
the screening actions. This leads to particularly troublesome results when the
screening actions succeed completely in shielding the actor from guilty knowl-
edge, as in our corporate cases. The actor lacks awareness of the high probabil-
ity of guilty facts, so by the lights of the Model Penal Code she is off the
hook-precisely because her willful ignorance succeeded so well!
Ignoring the distinctions among the different species of contrived ignorance
is a more subtle error, but an error nonetheless. A good example is what might
be called the waiver theory of willful ignorance. According to the waiver theory,
willful blindness waives the defense of ignorance. The waiver theory packs
intuitive appeal, and it actually explains the mysterious equation IGNORANCE =
KNOWLEDGE. The idea is that when ignorance is self-imposed, the plea of
ignorance is, to use the Latin word, nothing but chutzpah. The standard example
of chutzpah is the young man who murders his parents and then pleads for
mercy because he is an orphan. Now, of course, murdering one's parents is
intrinsically evil, while screening actions may be as innocent as simply not
looking in a suitcase. But the example nevertheless has much in common with
willful ignorance. In both, the wrongdoer has intentionally caused the condition
35. I am borrowing the term from Holly Smith, who speaks of "unwitting wrongful acts." Holly
Smith, Culpable Ignorance, 92 PHIL. REV. 543, 547 (1983). Smith uses the nice term "benighting acts"
for what I call "screening actions." I depart from her terminology with regret, and only because I've
encountered too many people unfamiliar with the word "benighting."
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of his own defense, and thereby waived that defense.36
The problem with the waiver theory is that it is too harsh. It seems appropri-
ate when the accused is our grand-scheming Fox, craftily contriving his own
defense. But what if the accused has been only recklessly ignorant, or negli-
gently ignorant? In that case it seems unjust to waive the defense of ignorance,
and convict him of performing the misdeed knowingly. He did nothing know-
ingly. He has been, at most, reckless in his screening actions, and his misdeeds
were unwitting. Recklessness plus ignorance doesn't add up to knowledge.37
The Model Penal Code standard and the waiver theory demonstrate the perils
of focusing completely on the unwitting misdeeds while ignoring the screening
actions. I now want to argue that it is equally wrong to focus entirely on the
screening actions and ignore the unwitting misdeeds.
V. THE Locus OF WRONGDOING
A natural question arises as to whether the blameworthiness of willful
ignorance comes from the screening actions or the unwitting misdeeds. In the
criminal law, the answer is simple. The actor will be convicted for knowingly
committing the unwitting misdeed, not for willfully blinding himself. He could
hardly be convicted for the screening actions, which most likely are perfectly
lawful. There is nothing criminal about not looking in a suitcase.
Outside the criminal law, matters are not so straightforward. Screening
oneself from knowledge can be viewed on analogy with drinking oneself into
oblivion. If a driver injures someone while he is too drunk to know what he is
doing, it may be unfair to blame him for driving poorly. His pickled synapses
don't permit him to drive better, or even to realize that he is too drunk to drive.
But it is perfectly appropriate to blame him for drinking himself into oblivion.
By the same token, one might argue that if an executive who screens herself
from guilty knowledge then unwittingly sets performance goals that her subordi-
nates cannot achieve lawfully, she shouldn't really be blamed for instigating
their crimes. She should be blamed for discouraging them from telling her the
score, and thereby screening herself from guilty knowledge. As people some-
times say to one another in everyday life, "I don't blame you for what you did,
but I do blame you for getting into the situation in the first place." This is a
theory of willful blindness as a form of culpable ignorance-very literally,
ignorance that is itself blameworthy.
On a culpable ignorance theory, the screening actions bear the primary blame.
What about the unwitting misdeeds? According to Holly Smith, who has
published an admirable analysis of culpable ignorance, they should be regarded
as mere consequences ensuing from the screening acts, consequences over
which the actor has ceded control. He has done this by screening himself from
36. See generally Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in the
Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REV. 1 (1985).
37. See id. at 8-15.
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the knowledge that would give him a reason to avoid an otherwise blameless
action, the unwitting misdeed.
Smith suggests that whether we blame him for the unwitting misdeed as well
as for the screening action depends entirely on whether we blame people for bad
consequences of their actions, even when they have no control over those
consequences.38 The law is inconsistent on this issue. We do punish completed
crimes more severely than failed attempts, even if the difference between
success and failure was out of the criminal's control, but we don't punish
criminals for the remote consequences of their crimes. Indeed, this is a well-
known paradox in criminal law. Generations of theorists have beaten their
brains out to little avail trying to devise a theory to explain why bad conse-
quences, not merely bad intentions, matter.39
Fortunately, we don't have to enter this debate, because Smith is mistaken to
treat unwitting misdeeds as brute consequences caused by the screening actions.
In effect, Smith treats the actor at the time of the unwitting misdeeds as if he
were a different person from the actor at the time of the screening actions. 40 The
"screener" becomes something akin to a manipulative criminal who causes an
innocent agent-his own later self-to commit a crime. In such cases, the
principal rightly gets all the blame, and the innocent agent gets none.4'
But this analysis overlooks the important fact that the later self is not entirely
innocent. The later self at least knows that he performed the screening actions at
an earlier time. He is on notice that the sword of potential wrongdoing dangles
over his head. The later self has an opportunity to reconsider and abandon a
course of action that might turn out to be an unwitting misdeed. If he persists in
38. See Smith, supra note 35, at 569.
39. George Fletcher has noted:
The relevance of the victim's suffering in the criminal law poses a serious hurdle to the
struggle for reasoned principles in the law. Generations of theorists have sought to explain
why we punish actual homicide more severely than attempted homicide, the real spilling of
blood more severely than the unrealized intent to do so. Our combined philosophical work
has yet to generate a satisfactory account of why the realization of harm aggravates the
penalty. Yet the practice persists in every legal system of the Western world. We cannot
adequately explain why harm matters, but matter it does.
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL 82-83
(1988). Fletcher explains the dimensions of the debate between "traditionalists," who focus on the
consequences of criminal actions, which may be outside the actor's control, and "modernists," who
focus on whatever is within the actor's control. Id. at 67-83.
40. See Smith, supra note 35, at 565-66.
41. To be precise, the analogy is not quite to a principal causing an innocent agent to act, because the
innocent-agent doctrine applies only in cases when the principal intends the agent's action. The Fox
intends his later self to perform the unwitting misdeed, but the Ostrich may not. In the Ostrich's case,
the analogy is not to innocent agency, but to a different causation analysis: A is held liable for B's crime
if B is innocent, and A unintentionally causes B to commit it. See Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause
and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 392 (1985). My argument
and terminology in this and the succeeding paragraphs has been heavily influenced by Kadish's article.
Kadish revisits the requirement of intention in a later article. See Sanford H. Kadish, Reckless
Complicity, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 369 (1997).
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acting, he shares in the blame. The more probable he believes the misdeed is,
the more he shares in the blame. Thus, the right analogue is not that of a guilty
principal (the earlier self) and an innocent agent (the later self) whose unwitting
misdeed is a causal consequence of the earlier self's screening actions. The right
analogue is that of a guilty principal and an agent who is at least reckless. The
analogy, in other words, is to complicity, not causation-remembering, of
course, that the complicitous principal and agent are the same person at two
different times.
The point is this: Just as the Model Penal Code and the waiver theory err by
focusing attention entirely on the unwitting misdeed (performed by the later
self), the culpable-ignorance theory errs by focusing attention entirely on the
screening actions (performed by the earlier self). To do full justice in cases of
contrived ignorance, we need some way of combining the two. Here, unfortu-
nately, the analogy to a guilty principal and a reckless agent doesn't help. There
is no formula for combining the guilt of a principal with that of an agent to
determine the guilt of both together, and thus there is no formula for assessing
an actor's guilt by combining the guilt of the earlier and later selves. We need
some alternative approach.
VI. A PROPOSAL
The very statement of the problem suggests its solution. If it is a mistake to
treat the screening actions and the wrongful misdeeds in isolation from each
other, we must reunite them into a single complex. In essence, this amounts to
broadening the time-frame in which we consider the unwitting misdeed, by
regarding it as a unitary action that begins when the actor commits the screen-
ing actions.4 2 Thus, the current suggestion avoids the errors of both the Model
Penal Code and the culpable ignorance theory. On this proposal, the relevant
question is "What was the actor's state of mind toward the unwitting misdeed at
the moment she opted for ignorance?" 43 As support for this suggestion, we can
return to the analogy of principal and agent. The agent, the self at the moment
of the unwitting misdeed, in effect ratifies the earlier self's decision to screen off
potentially guilty knowledge. This seems like a good reason for making the
earlier self's attitude toward the unwitting misdeed the focus of inquiry-for
that is the attitude that the later self is ratifying.44
42. See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REv.
591 (1981) (distinguishing broad and narrow time-frames in constructing criminal liability).
43. This proposal is Paul H. Robinson's suggested analysis of causing the conditions of one's own
defense, although Robinson does not apply it to willful ignorance. See Robinson, supra note 36, at
28-31. David Wasserman suggested to me the possibility of applying Robinson's idea in the context of
willful ignorance, and sketched the idea in a paper we co-authored with Alan Strudler. See David
Luban, Alan Strudler, & David Wasserman, Moral Responsibility in the Age of Bureaucracy, 90 MICH.
L. REv. 2348, 2387-88 (1992). I now believe that my co-authors and I erred by coupling this analysis of
willful ignorance with the kind of negligence analysis that I criticized earlier.
44. A word of explanation about what I mean by "the earlier self's attitude toward the unwitting
misdeed." Readers may object that if the earlier self has an attitude toward the misdeed, it is not
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I realize that this sounds quite abstract. To see the point of the proposal, let us
revisit our old friends the Fox and the Ostrich. The grand-scheming Fox has
mischief in his heart from the get-go, and his foray into contrived ignorance is
nothing more than an exercise in liability screening. What was his state of mind
toward the unwitting misdeed at the moment he opted for ignorance? That's
easy. Like Alfred P. Doolittle in My Fair Lady, he's wishing to commit
mischief, he's wanting to commit mischief, he's waiting to commit mischief.
And what is the judgment of him? It is a judgment that he has committed
mischief and willfully so.
The case of the Ostrich is a bit more complicated, because, at the moment she
pops her head in the sand, she herself may not know what her attitude is toward
the unwitting misdeeds she doesn't want to think about. So, when the Ostrich
successfully contrives not to have any mental attitude toward a possible future
misdeed, it may seem impossible, or even contradictory, to evaluate her blame-
worthiness by investigating the very mental attitude that, by assumption, does
not exist.
However, matters are not as hopeless as this way of putting things suggests.
The Ostrich contrives to block certain thoughts, but a mental state such as
intention is not the same thing as an occurrent thought. As Wittgenstein pointed
out, "[i]ntention is neither an emotion, a mood, nor yet a sensation or image. It
is not a state of consciousness. It does not have a genuine duration.",45 For
example, the fact that I intend to go away tomorrow does not entail that some
kind of thought about going away hovers in my consciousness from now until I
leave.46 Rather, the intention consists of a disposition to plan my activities
around going away tomorrow. 47 In the same way, we answer our question about
unwitting. If a business executive sets up a structure of deniability so that he never learns that his
employees must break laws to accomplish the goals he sets them, then he never knows that his instructions
unwittingly abet crimes. Thus, he has no attitude toward specific acts of aiding and abetting crime.
However, even if he has no specific act of aiding and abetting in mind, he may still have a generic act
in mind when he sets up the structure of deniability. That is, he may set up the structure with the
intention of establishing his own deniability for future crimes he expects his employees to commit on
his orders, in which case his attitude toward those crimes is one of willfulness. Or he may set up the
structure in conscious disregard of the substantial and unjustifiable risk that it will result in him giving
orders that can only be followed by unlawful means. In that case, his attitude is recklessness. His
attitude is toward the general act-type of aiding and abetting wrongdoing, not the particular instances-
what philosophers call "tokens" of that type-the wrongful character of which he has concealed from
himself.
45. LUDWIG WITrGENSTEN, ZETrEL § 45, at 10 (G.E.M. Anscombe trais., G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H.
von Wright eds., 1970).
46. " 'I have the intention of going away tomorrow.'-When have you that intention? The whole
time; or intermittently?" Id. § 46, at 10. Obviously, Wittgenstein means us to answer "the whole time,"
even though the conscious thought of going away tomorrow is intermittent-hence the conclusion that
the intention is distinct from the thought. Wittgenstein elaborates on this idea: "Really one hardly ever
says that one has believed, understood or intended something 'uninterruptedly' since yesterday. An
interruption of belief would be a period of unbelief, not the withdrawal of attention from what one
believes-e.g. sleep." Id. § 85, at 17.




the Ostrich's mental state toward the misdeed by answering a counterfactual
question about her disposition to commit it: "What would the Ostrich have
done had she not contrived her own ignorance?" There is no reason to doubt
that often we know what the answer to this question is.
Indeed, outside observers may be able to answer the question even when
the Ostrich herself cannot. In everyday life, our friends and relatives often
are able to predict what we are going to do in a major life-choice even while
we ourselves twist in an agony of indecision. Self-knowledge has never
been humankind's strong suit, and none of us is as unpredictable as we like to
think. Even though we can't answer the counterfactual question: "What
would she have done had she not contrived her own ignorance?" by scrutinizing
the Ostrich's psyche at the moment she performed the screening actions,
other, less subjective evidence may allow us to answer with reasonable
confidence. We never have direct access to another person's psyche in any
event, and so every inquiry into subjective states infers them from external
evidence. The counterfactual question is no harder to answer from external
evidence than other questions about subjective states, and juries answer
those every day, precisely by using external evidence to infer dispositions.
Evidence about the Ostrich's way of life may shed light on how she would act if
her contrived ignorance were stripped away. Remember Albert Speer, our
prototypical ostrich. We know quite enough about him to predict that no
revelation of horrors, not even a trip to Auschwitz, was likely to make Hitler's
minister of slave labor resign in protest. Even in cases where the objective
evidence is too scanty to judge confidently what the Ostrich would have done
had she known all the facts, there is no reason in principle to doubt that the
question has an answer. So we can still say this: If she would do the right thing
had she not screened herself from knowledge, then her attitude toward the
misdeed at the time she opted for ignorance is recklessness. For at that moment
she consciously elected to run the risk of unwitting wrongdoing. But, if she
actually would persist in ways of wickedness whether she had full knowledge or
not, it seems fair to attribute that willingness to her at the moment she
performed the screening actions. Even if she is in denial about it, hindsight
reveals that she is, very literally, the moral equivalent of a knowing performer
of misdeeds.
In other words, the proposal to examine states of mind toward the misdeed at
the time the actor opts for ignorance yields exactly the same judgments as our
earlier intuitions about the Fox and the Ostrich. That is no coincidence, of
course. The question we answer to determine the Ostrich's mental state-
"What would the Ostrich have done had she not contrived her own igno-
rance?"-is exactly the same question that in our earlier discussion we used to
grade her culpability. That is at least one reason to think that the proposal gets it
right: it leads us to ask the same question that underlies our moral intuitions
about the culpability of the Ostrich and the Fox.
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VII. LAWYERS BEHAVING BADLY: A REPRISE
To conclude, I want to return to the cases I began with-cases of contrived
ignorance by lawyers. As a law teacher, and in particular a teacher of legal
ethics, these cases seem particularly pressing to me.
We've seen that in legal ethics, unlike criminal law, there is no willful
blindness doctrine. Except in certain specialized circumstances, a lawyer is
under no obligation to press her client for knowledge or to corroborate what her
client tells her.48 If she uses a "don't ask, don't tell" interviewing strategy, and
her client subsequently commits perjury, the lawyer will not be charged with
knowingly putting on perjurious testimony. Here, willful blindness does not
equal knowledge. The question is whether it should.
My suggested approach would ask about our lawyer's mental state toward
putting on client perjury at that moment in the interview when she orders her
client not to tell her too much. In my experience, many lawyers expect clients to
perjure themselves when the stakes are high, suggesting that the "don't ask,
don't tell" lawyer is at least reckless toward future perjury, and, perhaps,
willful. This intuition suggests that "don't ask, don't tell" is an ethically
dubious way for lawyers to proceed.
Perhaps, then, legal ethics rules should be modified so that willful and
knowing ignorance count as knowledge. Doctrinally, adding a willful blindness
doctrine to legal ethics would involve nothing more than a minor change in the
terminology section of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Where the
Model Rules now state that " 'Knowingly,' 'Known,' or 'Knows' denotes actual
knowledge of the fact in question," the amended terminology would add: ...
or conscious avoidance of actual knowledge of the fact in question." 49
But I have grave doubts about this amendment. Minor as the change appears
on the printed page, it would totally transform the nature of the client-lawyer
relationship, and thus of legal practice, if it were honestly enforced-and not, I
think, for the better. Sophisticated clients with something to hide would have
reason to actively frustrate their own lawyers' factual investigation of their case,
because they would know that their lawyer is ethically required to ferret out
guilty information that she might then be ethically required to disclose. (Under
the current rule, if the client has something to hide, the lawyer can elect to leave
well enough alone, and the client can signal her to do so.) The worried client
may frustrate the lawyer's investigation even of innocent facts that the lawyer
needs, because the client does not know the facts are innocent. For the lawyer's
part, a lawyer who fears liability for consciously avoiding knowledge, and who
in any case needs information to represent her clients competently, may be
48. One special circumstance is imposed by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
requires lawyers to certify that the assertions they file in court papers are warranted in fact. FED. R. Civ.
P. l1(b)(3). Another is the issuing of opinion letters containing assertions about a client's financial
position. See Greycas v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding lawyer liable for damages
resulting when lawyer relied upon fraudulent client assertions when writing an opinion letter to lender).
49. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT TERMINOLOGY 9 (1994).
(Vol. 87:957
CONTRIVED IGNORANCE
forced to play a cat-and-mouse game of sleuthing against her own evasive
clients. Adding to the tension is the fact that the client is paying by the hour for
his lawyer to investigate him-and the more the client tries to frustrate the
investigation, the more time-consuming and costly it becomes. The lawyer has
become an inspector-general attached to the client, at the client's expense. The
client retains the lawyer because he must, while viewing the lawyer askance,
with a certain measure of dread and resentment. The client fears, sometimes
rightly, that he would be better off with no lawyer at all.
Furthermore, adding the willful blindness doctrine to ethics rules leaves great
uncertainty about how much inquiry into a client's case a lawyer must under-
take to avoid disciplinary action. Perhaps the doctrine would be read narrowly,
so that "conscious avoidance of knowledge" means only that the lawyer
consciously refrained from asking questions that, -but for the fear of discovering
guilty knowledge, she would have asked in order to help prepare the case. But
even then it is unclear what questions this obligation encompasses. For ex-
ample, does the doctrine require a criminal defense lawyer to ask every client if
he did the acts alleged? Faced with uncertainties, the fear of liability might
provoke lawyers to ratchet up the level of inquiry, further damaging the
client-lawyer relationship. Moreover, to determine how much due diligence a
lawyer actually did undertake, or whether the lawyer employed impermissible
"don't ask, don't tell" interview techniques, disciplinary authorities would have
to scrutinize privileged and confidential conversations between attorney and
client-perhaps all their conversations. All in all, the willful blindness doctrine
threatens to leave the client-lawyer relationship in a shambles.
All of these concerns have a familiar ring to them: they sound very much like
the bar's standard objections to proposals that would weaken confidentiality in
the name of truth. Invariably, the bar springs to the defense of confidentiality
and trots out a parade of horrible consequences if confidentiality is weakened-
damage done to the client-lawyer relationship, clients evading their lawyers'
questions for fear that the lawyer could be compelled to disclose damaging
information, lawyers being left out of the loop in business decisions, clients
hiding innocent information from their lawyers because they don't know the
facts are innocent. As William Simon has recently argued, none of these
objections is very persuasive, for two fundamental reasons. First, they all focus
exclusively on the costs to clients of enhanced disclosure, without considering
the social benefits of hampering dishonest clients. Second, they all make
behavioral assumptions about lawyers and clients that are at best unconfirmed
and at worst implausible.50 Do Simon's arguments apply here?
I believe not. To be sure, the willful blindness doctrine will elicit evasive
tactics only from clients who believe they have something to hide. Its aim is to
diminish the amount of client crime and fraud by making it harder for dishonest
clients to enlist lawyers in their efforts. But the number of clients who believe
50. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYER'S ETHICS 54-62 (1998).
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they have something to hide may be very large, and they are not all crooks.
When disputes lead to litigation, all parties may have done something discredit-
able or embarrassing; and when clients enter into business transactions, all sides
may be concealing weaknesses or defects in their wares. None of them will
appreciate a doctrine that they fear will require their own lawyers to search out
their dishonesties and then resign or report them. This result is much more
alarming than rules weakening confidentiality, under which the client with a
secret blemish at least has the option of withholding information from the
lawyer, who can remain passive and do the best she can with whatever
information the client gives her. Under the willful blindness doctrine, the lawyer
cannot remain passive. Her license is in jeopardy unless she actively investi-
gates the client.
As for the behavioral assumptions of the scenario I described above, they are
few and harmless. I assume only that clients whose lawyers are investigating
their embarrassments will try to hide the ball, that lawyers who face profes-
sional discipline if they avoid knowledge will feel impelled to investigate their
clients, and that neither lawyers nor clients will like each other very well while
all this is going on.
No doubt some of these problems could be solved. And perhaps the gain in
preventing lawyers from assisting client fraud is worth disrupting the client-
lawyer relationship as we now understand it. At the very least, however, we
should be extremely cautious about affixing a willful blindness doctrine to legal
ethics. The Law of Unintended Consequences looms too large.
Suppose, then, that legal ethics doctrine remains as it is today. The argument I
have been developing tells us that willful blindness is morally equivalent to
recklessness, or knowledge, or even willfulness, depending upon the lawyer's mo-
tive in avoiding knowledge. In that case, should the good lawyer avoid "don't
ask, don't tell" strategies even without a legal doctrine telling her to do so?
That seems to be the conclusion toward which the argument points us-but I
still have my doubts. Over the years, I have personally observed cases where a
client's story, taken as a whole, is true, but in which a few details may well have
been fabricated, probably out of panic or embarrassment. This causes an
excruciating dilemma. To investigate the story runs the risk of proving that the
details are false. In that case, a lawyer is ethically bound to retract court filings
containing the details. Doing so, however, dynamites the client's credibility,
even on the details that are true, and a case that the client deserves to win is lost,
perhaps at uttermost peril to the client.
The alternative? Willful blindness-break off the investigation, choose not to
find out the truth, go with the story that's already on the record. The theory that I have
been elaborating counsels that such willful blindness is morally indistinguish-
able from knowing deception-but every instinct screams that the theory is
wrong.
I know of no easy way out of this dilemma, but I have come to accept the
willful blindness alternative. The reason is that in the cases that I have been
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describing-in which telling the truth defeats justice-even a lie would be
morally excusable. That is, even though I endorse the ethics rules that forbid
lawyer untruthfulness, I also accept that good rules have exceptions. If a lie
would be morally excusable, then why not avail oneself of willful blindness,
which doesn't even violate the rules?
Of course, this is loophole lawyering, but here I think that there is a morally
sound reason to indulge in it. In part, no doubt, lawyers choose willful blindness
over excusable (but unlawful) lying to spare themselves the possibility of
professional discipline. But even when there is no realistic chance of being
caught, they still prefer willful blindness over excusable lying. One reason is
that it matters that in legal ethics willful blindness is lawful and lying is not. I
don't mean to suggest that one should never break the law against lying-I am
assuming a case in which lying would be morally excusable. But breaking the
law of professional ethics, like lying itself, is not without its moral costs, and
lawyers may be particularly sensitive to those costs. If so, a lawyer might well
yield to temptation and refrain from lying, even where the lie is morally
preferable to the truth. In that case, the lawyer should prefer willful blindness to
lying because willful blindness spares her the temptation of wrongfully telling
the truth. Earlier, we observed that people engage in willful blindness to spare
themselves moral dilemmas. Exactly that dynamic is at work here-only here
sparing oneself a dilemma is the right thing to do, because otherwise one might
give in to the temptation not to lie. Quite simply, breaking a rule of professional
misconduct is a Rubicon many lawyers refuse to cross, even when it is the right
thing to do. Availing themselves of the loophole that contrived ignorance
provides enables them to do the right thing without crossing the Rubicon.
Just call me an ostrich. But on this issue I'm an unrepentant ostrich, because I
don't think that the unwitting misdeed of putting on a fundamentally truthful
case with a few false details really is a misdeed. And that allows me to conclude
that as a general rule, lawyers should avoid willful ignorance of inconvenient
knowledge, just as everyone should-although this general rule has exceptions.
In my view, the most inexcusable form of lawyer willful ignorance occurs
when lawyers paper questionable deals for questionable clients because the
price is right. A banker recollects that in the Roaring Eighties "for half a million
dollars you could buy any legal opinion you wanted from any law firm in New
York.", 51 The ethics rules prohibit lawyers from knowingly counseling or
assisting a client in fraud, but there's no duty to investigate the client and no
willful blindness doctrine, so ... well, you do the math. Surely, a good lawyer
should regard it as her duty to investigate before closing a deal.52
51. MARTIN MAYER, THE GREATEST-EVER BANK ROBBERY: THE COLLAPSE OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN
INDUSTRY 20 (1990).
52. In saying this, I reject the Fourth Circuit's noisome opinion in Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485
(4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 936 (1992), according to which "lawyers have no duty to
disclose information about clients to third party purchasers or investors," id. at 490 and "a lawyer or
law firm cannot be liable for the representations of a client, even if the lawyer incorporates the client's
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That leads us back to Joseph Hutner and the computer crooks. We left Mr.
Hutner figuratively clamping his hands over his ears and running out of the
office. What happened next?
Hutner's law firm retained a pair of legal ethics experts, and made it clear that
the firm hoped it wouldn't have to fire or blow the whistle on its wayward
client. The ethics experts were only too happy to oblige. They advised that the
law firm could not reveal the client's past frauds, and could continue to close
deals for the computer company, provided that steps were taken to detect
dishonesty. In fact, the experts cautioned, if the firm stopped representing the
computer company it would signal that something was amiss, and that would
violate client confidentiality.
Unfortunately, willful ignorance seems to be habit-forming, and the law
firm's monitoring of the loans was timid and easy for the resourceful criminals
to evade. Some evidence suggests that the firm wanted to know as little as
possible about the uprightness of the loans it was closing, because it didn't want
to part ways with the client. As a result, the firm closed another $60 million in
crooked loans for the computer company. When the lawyers discovered this, an
ethics farce ensued. Their ethics experts advised that these new frauds had now
become past frauds protected by the confidentiality rule. At this point, Hutner's
firm decided that it was finally time to resign. The ethics experts sternly
admonished that the firm should keep strict confidentiality while it turned the
client over to another law firm. As a result, the new law firm proceeded in
honest ignorance to close $15 million in fraudulent loans for the crooks before
the plot unraveled. First farce, then tragedy. Hutner's law firm paid $10 million
to defrauded lenders to settle law suits.
It's not a happy ending, but perhaps it's an edifying one. The law firm had
two experts' opinions attesting that it had done what the ethics rules required,
but it was nevertheless prepared to pay millions of dollars not to have its willful
blindness put before a jury. Perhaps that tells us something about what we really
think of contrived ignorance as a moral excuse.
misrepresentations into legal documents or agreements necessary to closing the transaction," id. at
495.
The case involved a law firm, Weinberg & Green, which .papered a deal in which Rosenberg, the
firm's client, defrauded the Schatzes. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial judge's dismissal of the
Schatzes' securities fraud claim against the law firm. See id. at 498. Some of the Fourth Circuit's
arguments bordered on the comic. Outright lies are fraud under federal securities law, but mere silence
is not fraud absent a duty to disclose. The Fourth Circuit collapsed the distinction, and argued that
because Weinberg & Green owed no duty to the Schatzes, there was no fraud in its silence about
Rosenberg's outright lies, even though the lawyers were incorporating them into the documents they
prepared. See id. at 490-92. The court simply rolled outright lies into the category of nonfraudulent
nondisclosures. In response to the Schatzes' powerful argument that Maryland's stringent legal ethics
rules required Weinberg & Green to disclose the misrepresentations or withdraw from representing
Rosenberg, the court stated that ethics rules are not rules of civil liability-completely ignoring the
Schatzes' point that ethics violations should establish liability under federal securities law, not under the
ethics rules. See id. at 492-93.
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